How do our beliefs interact with our practical interests? Does the practical significance we attach to the truth or falsehood of p sometimes influence how strongly we believe it? If so, when are we more likely to notice the influence, and what can we say about how it happens?
of belief vary, depending upon how it matters, upon what she takes to be at stake on the truth of the belief? I have elsewhere discussed at some length the idea that a belief state might be stake-sensitive in this way; here I will be more concise.
1 Stake-sensitive belief. You are in a conversation with a student, who asks you: in which part of his paper on truth and probability did Ramsey give that example about the unwholesome yellow toadstools? After a moment, you reply: in the last section of the paper, on the 'logic of truth.' Soon after the student leaves your office, the phone rings. A local radio station invites you to play their quiz game. The prize for a correct answer to their question is valuable, a fabulous overseas trip, and they offer you several subjects to choose among. You pick 'Probabilism,' and to your amazement, they ask the very same question. Now you think a little longer; it seems like it was the last section of the paper, but could it have been earlier when Ramsey was talking about beliefs and frequencies?
What, if anything, might be different for you in the two situations? What, if anything, is different about your belief that the yellow toadstool example is in the last section of the paper? The story is not perfect, but it is intended to bring us to the neighborhood of our topic. 2 To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? Might we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p, yet believing that p more strongly in the one context than in the other? In order for that to happen, a doxastic state, a belief state, must have a certain sort of complexity, a context-sensitivity that yields, in the presence of one set of stakes, a belief of one strength, and in the presence of different stakes, a belief of a different strength. So the question being asked is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think they should be modeled in a theory about them.
If a belief that p is stake-sensitive, then in the absence of contextual stakes, its strength is not definite. 3 It is a persistent doxastic state, let us assume, yet it exerts patterns of influence on choice and inference that vary, when what is understood to be at stake on p varies. Given its persistence, over time we might notice the belief's stake-sensitivity when there is a shift in the The question is not confined to beliefs that are rational; I am interested in stake-sensitive belief, whether rational or not. For what it's worth, and without argument here, I tend to think that sometimes beliefs are stake-sensitive (in the peculiar way I have described), while also thinking that the ways that may happen are often not rational.
Contexts of deliberation, however, might provide occasions where we find rational stakesensitive beliefs. Periods of extended, perhaps intermittent, deliberation are in some ways special contexts, to be sure, and my beliefs about what my current deliberation will lead me to do are in some ways special beliefs. But if we seek examples of rational stake-sensitive belief, then contexts of deliberation, special though they may be, are a natural place to look.
A belief is stake-sensitive when the strength with which you hold it varies in response to variation in how it matters to you, variation in what you take to be at stake on it. One sort of variation is variation in the size of the stakes. Sensitivity to the size of the stakes is often raised in pragmatic encroachment discussions, when we consider a believer or knower moving between low-stakes and high-stakes contexts, for example. In previous work on belief I highlighted sensitivity to the sizes of the stakes, as in the above story of the radio quiz game. Another sort of variation is variation in the odds of the stakes, or in the shape of the stakes. These variations may occur together. By variation in the odds, I mean variation in the comparative value the believer sees in the truth and in the falsehood of the belief. This might be taken to be the ratio of the perceived value of the belief's truth to the perceived value of its falsehood, on some particular value scale.
Imagine that in one context you regard p as much better than ~p, but in another context you do not, and in another ~p is better than p. If that is the source of shifts in how strongly you believe that p in each context, then your belief is stake-sensitive.
4
The question of whether beliefs are stake-sensitive can be raised for full beliefs, for categorical beliefs, and for degrees of belief. Suppose we are talking about action-guiding degrees of belief; a stake-sensitive belief in p could be characterized by a set of fair betting quotients, rather than a single one. Which of the fair betting quotients accurately measures the belief could depend on the context, and in particular, on what you then take to be at stake on p. In other words, a stakesensitive degree of belief in p could have a strength that depends on context, and in particular, on the stakes that you take to actually be in play, as given by valuations you currently attribute to p and to ~p. The current valuations reflect the part that p plays in your current pragmatic interests; the degrees of belief reflect your willingness, in various contexts, to take on new interests and commitments to which p is relevant. 5 In the discussion that follows, let us take beliefs to be degrees of belief; I will assume that rational degrees of belief are subjective probabilities.
If p is one of many members of a partition, it is natural to think of the shape of the stakes on p as 'But I thought you would be looking for me in Damascus,' said the man.
'Not at all,' said death "that is why I was surprised to see you yesterday. I knew that today I was to find you in Aleppo."
Now suppose the man knows the following. Death works from an appointment book which states the time and place; a person dies if and only if the book correctly states in what city he will be at the stated time. The book is made up weeks in advance on the basis of highly reliable predictions. An appointment on the next day has been inscribed for him. Suppose, on this basis, the man would take his being in Damascus the next day as strong evidence that his appointment with death is in Damascus, and would take his being in Aleppo the next day as strong evidence that his appointment is in Aleppo.
9
To find his best option by using causal decision theory, as I will assume he should, the man can use the possible states 'Damascus is inscribed' and 'Aleppo is inscribed.' He takes those states to be outside his causal influence, and they are sufficiently specific, given his present interests, to So it is compatible with deliberation dynamics that the man's belief that he will go to Aleppo is stake-sensitive, and given a reasonable dynamical rule for making such shifts-a rule that seeks the good-there need be nothing irrational about the dependence of that belief on the value of its truth. Here, then, is a scenario for a rational stake-sensitive belief: In extended deliberation, my belief that I will do A sometimes reasonably depends on the shape of what is at stake on its truth.
During our deliberations we sometimes entertain beliefs about, and often have experiences of, assessing and comparing. But how often? To the extent that we suspect that deliberation may at times proceed without them, we leave room for the possibility of rationally stake-sensitive belief. We can investigate whether it is a rational requirement that, throughout your deliberation, you maintain a live stream of beliefs about how you currently evaluate your options, or that you monitor all your evaluations in experience. We can also look for empirical evidence that you do one or the other whenever you deliberate. The theory of deliberation dynamics neither expects, requires, nor excludes that you do either. Suppose we had empirical support for the idea that your rational belief about what you will do, during your deliberation, is a stake-sensitive response to your regard for doing it. What, if anything, would that tell us about other beliefs of yours? That surely depends on the nature of the empirical support, but the stake-sensitivity of some rational beliefs would be significant, leading us to wonder whether the means by which it occurs also appear in other situations, affecting other beliefs.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen that extended deliberation is a setting in which some rational beliefs
are influenced by what is at stake on their truth. If that influence is direct, and does not destroy and create new belief states, the beliefs are stake-sensitive as well as rational. If influence must always be mediated by other beliefs or by experience, they need not be. The latter alternative seems to me doubtful, but for all I have said, it may be so. Our actual deliberative practices are one source of evidence, among others, that may shed more light on the topic of rational stakesensitive belief.
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3 This indefiniteness might be seen as a source of imprecision; I have explored that idea elsewhere but do not focus on it here. 4 Your friend offers to place your bet, along with his own, at the racetrack. You tell him to bet $20 on the horse you like, Apparition. You are anticipating a good race and prospects of victory when your friend returns with your bet on Whirlwind. No doubt this affects your hopes about the outcome of the race; if it also affects your beliefs that Apparition will win, or that Whirlwind will, those beliefs seem sensitive to the shape of the stakes on their truth. 5 Taking on a new commitment, say by accepting a new bet on p at odds that fit your degree of belief in p, would alter the part p plays in your new current interests. That might in turn influence your new degree of belief in p. Does making a bet on p ever lead you to become more confident, or less confident, in the truth of p? 6 There is some abuse of notation here and below; I sometimes use A to refer to an action, and sometimes to the proposition 'I do A'. 7 The offer expires day after tomorrow; the election is on Tuesday; a plan must be in place by next week; I have one minute to make a move... Since the time of Richard Jeffrey's development of evidential decision theory (Jeffrey 1965) , and before, there have been objections to the idea that I may deliberate about doing A, and simultaneously have some belief about whether I will do A. Evidential decision theory expects an agent to assess A's desirability using conditional beliefs of the form pr(-/A). Without argument, I assume here that present deliberation and present belief about the future action are compatible, and related. 8 Such settings often appear in games among Bayesian players; Battle of the Sexes with a Twin is an example. 9 Gibbard and Harper (1978, pp. 185-186 Shah (1967) . Different cities appear in various earlier versions of the story. 10 Here I use the K-expectation version of causal decision theory due to Skyrms (1982) . Causal decision theory endorses going to Aleppo in the sense that going to Aleppo's expected utility U is maximal, and U represents his preferences. To say that causal decision theory endorses action A is to rely on a principle that endorses actions that maximize U. 11 A plausible answer is toss a coin, or adopt some internal way of performing a mixed act (Harper 1986 ). However, mixed acts might be ruled out or heavily penalized (Weirich 1985) . We might question the legitimacy of such a restriction, but I save that for another occasion. In what follows, I neglect beliefs and assessments concerning mixed acts, but it is straightforward to include them, if a decision-maker takes them to be among his options. 12 See Skyrms (1982) . In later work, Skyrms (1990) developed an important connection between dynamic deliberation and well-founded solution concepts for noncooperative games among Bayesian players. In decision problems with more than two options, deliberation can be significantly more complex than in Death in Damascus. 13 When you deliberate about different sorts of problems, your shifting beliefs and evaluations follow different sorts of paths. When causal decision theory is used to evaluate your options in a Newcomb Problem, for example, deliberation may yield straightforward convergence to high confidence that you will take both boxes, and that the opaque box will be empty, since an increasing confidence that you will take both boxes does not lead you to think it would be better to do otherwise. In connection with our larger interests, I do not suggest that all deliberations are clarified by deliberation dynamics; in many deliberations our assessments carry no significant evidence about the state of the world (e.g. what is inscribed). Examples of decision instability such as Death in Damascus provide a setting where beliefs about what you will do matter in deliberation, and the theory of deliberation dynamics gives a framework for saying how they matter, and how they are affected by deliberation. 14 Also, how much do your beliefs about what you will do depend on your assessments of those values? An interesting question; here I suppose that the belief shifts are driven only by your shifting assessments of your options. 15 The idea of dynamics that seek the good is Skyrms ' (1990, p. 30) . Such dynamics must also raise the sum of the probabilities of all the actions better than the status quo. Nash, Darwin, and Bayes dynamics are examples of dynamics that seek the good. Dynamics that seek the good may fail to represent the deliberations and actions of some agents. An akratic agent, for example, may have little reason to raise beliefs that at the moment of action he will do what now looks better. (Thanks to Brian Kim here.) A self-destructive agent may have reason to lower those beliefs.
